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HUMANISTIC CRIMINOLOGY:
IS IT POSSIBLE?
CLAYTON A. HARTJEN1
RUTGERS UNIVERSITY - NEWARK
ABSTRACT
A humanistic criminology is one that would be
oriented to human betterment and fulfillment,
as opposed to conventional criminology
oriented to the control of crime and
suppression of offenders. Some of the
obstacles that stand in the way of developing
a humanistic criminology, as well as some of
the reasons why these obstacles do not
necessarily preclude its being established,
are addressed. Some reasons why humanistic
criminology is desirable are suggested.
Given that humanistic criminology is viable a
critique of contemporary schools of
criminology/criminal justice is offered and a
number of suggestions are made regarding what
an academic department of criminology
oriented to humanism would study and
emphasize in its curriculum and goals.
1. This is a substantially revised and
expanded version of a paper presented at the
American Society of Criminology meetings in
Denver, 1983. My thanks to S. Priyadarsini,
Jayshree Parthasarathy, and Lucile Duberman
for their comments and suggestions.444
INTRODUCTION
A number of years ago Gibson (1970:56)
commented on the underlying perspective
criminologists have had of their subject
matter and the purposes of their inquiry:
The assumptions of
conventional criminology are that
the law and all the apparatus which
supports it can be taken for
granted as a given fact. It could
be, should be, improved this way or
that as time goes on, but
nevertheless it represents a norm
which all right-thinking people
support. Criminals are deviants,
and it is the duty of
criminologists to work towards the
end of suppressing crime even if
the ideal of abolishing it may
never be reached.
Although they are not usually explicitly
expressed, these assumptions provided the
philosophical and programatic bases for both
the classical and positivist schools of
criminology from the late eighteenth century
to the present time (see Gibbons, 1979;
Pelfrey, 1980). Even though the scope,
character, and focus of criminological
inquiry changed somewhat with the advent of
the labeling perspective and the development
of the conflict, critical, and radical
criminologies that emerged during the
1960s-1970s, the fundamental nature of
criminological inquiry has not been
substantially altered. Praxis was advocated,
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new villains (e.g., corporate criminals, the
police) were brought forward as worthy
objects of criminological attention, and new
topics of inquiry (law and the criminal
justice system) became popular. However, a
"correctional" orientation still dominates
criminological thinking and activities.
Employing methods of scientific inquiry and
geared to improving the criminal justice
system (making it more effective, efficient,
and/or fair, not to speak of "just"),
contemporary criminology is still primarily
concerned with explaining the causes of
criminality and finding ways to prevent or
reduce the frequency of criminal acts.
Contemporary criminology has largely been
justified in terms of an ideology which holds
that through the accumulation of scientific
knowledge about crime, its causes and
control, criminology can "save us," either
from the criminal or unfair justice (Reasons,
1975). Thus, by emulating the physical
sciences and accepting as given the
deterministic assumptions of positivism, the
pursuit of empirical truth, numeric
information, system management and
improvement, and personnel training have
become the hallmarks of modern
correctional-oriented criminology/criminal
justice. Understanding the human phenomenon
of crime is, at best, a secondary and
marginal concern.
It is my purpose in this paper to
emphasize this secondary and marginal concern
by articulating what I believe to be the
characteristics and prospects of a new
criminology -- a humanistic criminology. To
do so, I shall address three issues: (1) the
characteristic features of a humanistic
criminology, (2) the possibilities for
developing such an enterprise, and (3) what
an academic department of criminology
oriented to humanistic considerations might
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look like.
DEFINING HUMANISTIC CRIMINOLOGY
What are the distinguishing features of
a humanistic criminology? What would a
humanistic criminology address, do, value,
and seek to achieve? Given the rather
diverse and not always clearly specified
versions of humanism expressed by the members
of various social scientific disciplines
(primarily sociology and psychology) this is
not as easy or noncontroversial a question as
might be imagined.
Based upon the various characterizations
of humanism expressed by a number of writers
(e.g., Gouldner, 1970: 481-513; Lee, 1987;
Gella, Jansen, & Sabo, Jr., 1978; Tifft &
Sullivan, 1980; and Young, 1984) I would
suggest that in contrast to a
correctional-criminology oriented to the
scientific discovery of the causes and cures
of crime, a humanistic criminology is a
criminology that is also oriented to
individual freedom and enjoyment of life,
while striving to protect and promote human
dignity and survival. Humanistic criminology
is an active enterprise dedicated to social
change and betterment. And it is
fundamentally oriented to improving the human
condition, not only in terms of technological
advances but in terms of personal and social
fulfillment as well. In pursuing this
course, humanistic criminology is also
existential and relative, as opposed to
empirical and deterministic, in that it is
concerned with the experiencing of life
rather than mere description and explanation
of "social facts" or human behaviors.
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Moreover, it is value committed, rather than
value neutral, but strives for objectivity in
matters of fact and truth. It is skeptical
of scientific claims, but it is not
necessarily anti-scientific. It is, instead,
opposed to "scientism" (as depicted by Lee,
1978). Thus, a humanistic criminology would
be people-centered, ethical, critical,
oriented to ameliorating social adversity,
and dedicated to undermining the myths and
rationalizations that have been and continue
to be employed to maintain and justify the
position and privileges of the elites in
human societies (Lee, 1978:94; 1980:5; also
see Pepinsky & Jesilow, 1984; Young, 1984).
Such a criminology would (indeed,
should) continue to employ scientific methods
of research, but it would not be scientific
in the traditional "positivistic" notions of
science. Instead, "rather than trying to
find out what is, the humanist uses data to
calculate what =n be"(Pepinsky, 1979:250).
Indeed, scientific methods of data collection
are ways of systematically and purposively
experiencing the social and natural worlds,
although they are not necessarily the only
viable or possible ways of acquiring such
experience (see Hartjen, 1981). Many
humanistic-criminologists do employ
scientific research techniques as useful
tools in gaining the kind of understanding
they need to pursue their goal of human
fulfillment and betterment. Using the
techniques of science does not prevent one
from being a humanist. It is not the
"technique" so much as the attitude one has
in employing it that distinguishes between a
humanistic versus a "scientism" approach in
criminology. That is, it is not how one goes
about acquiring knowledge as it is the kinds
of understanding one pursues and what one
does with it that separates the
criminological humanist from the agent of
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social control.
Also, while law and its administration
would remain central topics for
criminological analyses, a humanistic
criminology would u be oriented to
political anarchy, to the abolition of law,
or, more correctly, the need for its coercive
force (see Black, 1976; 1980). In this
regard, a humanistic criminology would be
sensitive to topics such as racism, sexism,
and militarism (as suggested by Herman &
Julia Schwendinger, 1970). However, it would
continue to retain a "legal" definition of
crime, for it is only by so doing that the
political (legal) nature of crime as a
construct in the service of elites could be
highlighted. Insofar as law (especially
criminal law) is used to justify exploitation
or does not itself provide or help to secure
an improved human condition, it is the duty
of humanistic criminology to critique the
legal order and to reveal its antihuman
structures. The definition of crime used by
political authorities (legal definitions)
facilitates accomplishing this task by, on
the one hand, revealing the persons and
behaviors such authorities seek to repress
and, on the other hand, exposing what they
choose to promote or sanction (see Hartjen,
1972; also see Quinney, 1979; Chambliss,
1984).
A number of criminologists already
practice some version of humanistic
criminology, wittingly or not. And many
others have made important contributions
central to the concerns of criminological
humanists. Thus, while it would be
inappropriate to associate criminological
humanism with any specific works or
individuals in this essay, and while some of
us even call ourselves humanists or
mn iQ criminologists, the issue of
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concern here is not who is or is not
humanistic but that of assessing whether a
bhianis crminlogy is possible? By
possible, I mean "doable," or achievable, as
a viable intellectual enterprise rather than
an individual endeavor on the part of some
criminologists. Moreover, given its
plausibility, what would such a criminology
look like?
THE POSSIBILITY OF HUMANISTIC CRIMINOLOGY
There are at least three different
answers to the central question posed here:
(1) a negative answer NO, (2) a positive
answer YES, and (3) a HUMANISTIC answer.
THE NEGATIVE CASE
Undoubtedly a host of obstacles stand in
the way of a humanistic criminology. Among
these are three reasons why some people may
feel that the kind of humanistic criminology
described above is not possible, or at least
not likely to develop. One, such a
criminology is adverse to governmental and
political interests. As Kennedy (1970)
notes, crime is a political phenomenon,
essential to the maintenance of the political
state. Thus, insofar as the creation of
crime is a major means of governmental social
control (Black, 1976), governments are not
likely to support, and may actually resist an
active, value-committed criminology, one
dedicated to change, betterment, freedom, and
social justice. On the other hand,
"scientific" criminology is well-suited to
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the interests of government. Officials want
data about offenders, systems, and outcomes.
Primarily, they want facts that may be
ignored or used as needed to maintain control
and dominance (Quinney, 1974; Jackson,
1984). Humanistic criminologists would not
only refrain from providing such information,
but the whole humanistic tradition is
directly opposed to so doing. Indeed,
humanistic criminology would be oriented to
questioning and investigating government,
especially with regard to its role in the
crime-creation process. Financial support
from the government to pursue this activity
is therefore not likely to be forthcoming,
and without such support the criminological
enterprise is jeopardized.
Second, as Sylvester (1975: 224) points
out, criminology, regardless of type or form,
inevitably deals with questions of right and
wrong. The only credence people are likely
to give to any statements criminologists
might make about such questions (above and
beyond their proclivity to agree beforehand
with any of them) is that our statements are
valid depictions of objective reality; an
assessment of our truth-claims that is not
likely to be made unless such claims are
cloaked in the robe of scientific
respectability. Thus, to the extent that we
want to be listened to, heard, and to some
extent make a difference, departing from
scientific objectivity (i.e., being openly
value committed) detracts from that
achievement. A discipline, however noble and
well intended, is not likely to survive as a
discipline for very long if no one listens or
values what its members have to say.
Third, humanistic criminology may also
face internal defeat. A criminology that is
committed and actively oriented to achieving
good and to improving the human condition
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invariably encounters the problem of deciding
what values are to be pursued -- what
constitutes an improved human condition. For
example, is it our purpose to (a) rid the
streets of drug dealers, (b) successfully
rehabilitate drug addicts, (c) see to it that
drug users receive their constitutional
rights, (d) promote the right of addicts to
use drugs as they want as a humanistic right
to pursue the enjoyment of life as they see
it, or (e) all of the above? Moreover, how
active should we be in pursuing any of these
goals, or how are we to go about doing so at
all? Are we to be scholar-activists; and, if
so, what are the limits of our activism?
Even now criminology is torn between those
who think human betterment could be achieved
if more lawbreakers were put behind bars or
kept there for longer periods of time,
whereas others argue that we should tear down
the walls -- either of prisons or the
capitalist state (see Inciardi, 1980 for
discussions of these various views). To the
extent that criminologists are not likely to
concur on the basic agenda for a humanistic
criminology (or, indeed, over the way I have
characterized it here), it is not likely that
they would actually engage in such an
enterprise as an organized discipline.
THE POSITIVE CASE
Regardless of the kinds of obstacles one
might envision, it is possible to achieve a
humanistic criminology for a number of
reasons. One, in contemporary society,
"science" may have lost some of its aura and
the respect it received from the general
public (as well as many scientists).
Although technological advances from the
computer chip to nuclear energy have done
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much to change the quality of physical life,
these changes have not always or necessarily
been for the better. Word-processing
machines may make it less physically onerous
to produce written documents, but they hardly
compensate for life with "the bomb." People
are becoming skeptical about the credibility
of scientific claims or its ability to
actually uncover valid information. In fact,
such skepticism is engendered by the very
nature of the scientific enterprise itself.
In criminology, for instance, squabbling over
how best to measure crime rates, whether or
not lower-class people are really more
criminal than more privileged persons, or
whether the crime problem can be solved
through mandatory sentencing policies or more
funds for rehabilitation may not only be
viewed by the lay public as exercises in
intellectual trivia in many cases but does
little to install confidence in the
conclusions reached by conventional
criminology.
People have also become more educated
and sophisticated. They now realize that
Lundberg's (1947) claim that science (social
or otherwise) can save us was an
overstatement, to say the least. Science
cannot answer all questions or solve all
problems. In fact, science may have done
much to generate many of the problems people
now face (such as "the bomb," overpopulation,
and chemical contaminants). And science
seems to have made few inroads in reducing
the appeal of religious dogma and the bigotry
espoused by various "moral entrepreneurs.'
In this respect, the cloak of science may not
be as necessary to a viable criminology as
some believe or as it may have been at one
time. Perhaps it is not how scientifically
valid our statements are that counts, but how
meaningful they are to the people who hear
them (see Lynd, 1936 and Lazarsfeld, et al.,
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1967).
Second, money is nice, but it is not
essential to criminological inquiry or
activities. One can and many people have
done research in criminology without large
government grants or extensive financial
backing. Indeed, excellent criminological
insights and thought have been expressed by
numerous criminologists who were not
necessarily subsidized by some funding agency
or institution. Conversely, in spite of the
peer review process, large sums of money
poured into a research project do not
guarantee the quality or relevance of the
results. Besides my own experiences working
for government agencies, a number of other
people employed in such agencies have also
told me that their research often has little,
if anything, to to do with the discovery of
scientifically valid or interesting
information. Instead, emphasis is placed on
keeping the agency "in business' and not
making waves. In some instances the results
of such research may even be suppressed when
it is politically or bureaucratically
inexpedient to allow public dissemination.
Lack of government support would, of
course, hinder members of the discipline.
But it may also liberate them. And it may
help to stimulate the creativity and
reflective thought essential to the pursuit
of knowledge and understanding. Even then,
there are a number of resources that
criminologists have largely left untapped in
their quest for funds in the service of the
agencies of law and governmental control.
And if being heard is essential to a
humanistic criminology, but the lack of a
national sample or an appropriate "This
research was funded by ..." citation inhibits
publication in established journals,
humanistic publications are by no means
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unknown. And as some humanistically-oriented
criminologists have come to realize,
ultimately there is also the soapbox, the
political caucus, and the duplicating machine
at our disposal. If what we say is worth
saying, someone will eventually hear us.
Third, humanistic criminologists may not
agree among themselves as to the dimensions
or agenda of the field. But little such
agreement has ever been found in the
discipline anyway. Dispute is inevitable and
healthy, whether one is talking about crime
control versus due process, regression versus
correlation analysis, praxis, or survival.
Humanistic criminologists have a place and a
stake in the disputes that concern our lives,
both within and outside criminology. Not
getting into the ruckus, not playing the
game, not hustling our own point of view or
interests guarantees that others will express
and secure theirs. We may not know or agree
on what "a better human condition" looks
like, but it is not likely to get any better
by doing nothing. As Pepinsky (1979:250)
states: "Human beings do not have to do
research to find out what it takes to conform
to the world as it is. Instead, the species
who have even created the idea of God in
their own heads can create ideas of how the
species can build new ways of life in their
changing environments." It is the task of
humanistic criminology to help create these
ideas and to show how they might be
implemented, not to dictate the ways of life
we are to choose.
A HUMANISTIC ANSWER
Regardless of its practicality or
ultimate form, a humanistic criminology is
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possible for the very simple reason that it
is necessary. In the first place, as a
discipline of knowledge and action
criminology must be humanistic, in large part
because of the very subject matter with which
it deals. To be anything else would be at
best androidic and at worst barbaric. Right
and wrong, crime and justice, punishment and
freedom are not trivial matters. They are
central to the very essence of human life.
Taking another's life, either in the form of
a crime or legal execution, is not an
occasion for bland unconcern. Although one
should be objective in assessing or gathering
facts concerning such matters, if only
because securing reasonably accurate
information requires such a stance, to be
purely objective, to be purely pragmatic, to
be simply interested in "truth" when
confronted with criminal matters is to deny
the very humanness of the criminological
enterprise. As physicians must retain a
sense of detachment when dealing with
patients (to apparently deflect the cultural
taboos regarding physical intimacy or to keep
their balance among the horrors they
routinely must face) criminologists also may
be required to develop a similar attitude.
But as with the physician, to be uncaring,
unfeeling, unsympathetic, or unemotional
about our subject matter and the human beings
with whom it is concerned is to be inhuman.
Although there are probably few if any
criminologists who actually fit this
description, the ethos of humanism as opposed
to scientism maintains that such detachment
is both unnecessary and unwarranted.
Second, what has scientific criminology
(in the restricted sense) done any way?
Essentially none of the main questions or
concerns of scientific criminology have been
answered or accomplished. To again quote
Pepinsky (1979:250):
456
... ostensibly new discoveries
about crime turn out, upon
historical reflection, to look just
like old discoveries in a former
heyday for partisans of a competing
truth about crime. Give it a
century or two to grow, and the
course of development of positivist
knowledge takes on an awful
banality, provoking pessimism and
cynicism about human beings'
capacity to shape their social
destiny.
If anything, the major accomplishment of
scientific criminology has been one that is
central to a humanistic orientation or point
of view -- the politicalization of
criminological thought. After more than a
century of failing to prove that criminals
are somehow different from (and inferior to)
noncriminals, some criminologists have come
to realize that criminals are not the central
subject of the field anyway. Rather, as
Quinney (1980) and Turk (1982) suggest, it is
the political nature of the crime-creation
process, indeed, the political nature of
crime as such that is of principle
criminological concern. Such a concern is
eminently humanistic. It is humanistic
because it directs our attention to the
fundamental human condition, the social,
economic, and political relations of persons
in societies that not only engender
criminality (both legally prohibited and
condoned) but also necessitate as well as
facilitate the use of formal, repressive
means of social control. The political
individualization of responsibility and its
sanctification in law provided not only for
the creation of crime, but for the
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criminological investigation of the very
conditions of privilege and oppression that
necessitated crime's creation in the first
place.
And this, perhaps, is why humanistic
criminology is essential. That is, without a
humanistic orientation criminology is a
sterile enterprise. Without humanism,
criminology would do little more than crank
out numbers, descriptions of criminals,
evaluations of programs, and conflicting
strategies to solve the crime problem -- with
little meaning or purpose beyond maintaining
or enhancing positions of dominance and
privilege. Scientific methods and
techniques, of course, are among the tools we
may use to gain experience and hopefully the
understanding we need to achieve human
betterment. But, positive science provides
neither the basis or the essential condition
for achieving criminological understanding.
Crime and crime control are human and not
merely behavioral or social phenomena. As
such, humanism is the very heart of
criminology. In short, a humanistic
criminology is, of course, possible because
no other kind of criminology would be worth
pursuing.
DOING HUMANISTIC CRIMINOLOGY
Theoretically humanistic criminology
could be practiced wherever criminologists
pursue their craft, whether conducting
research, providing technical or consultant
services, administering programs, or
teaching. In practice, outside the academic
setting, criminologists have little chance to
pursue the goals of humanism insofar as they
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largely work for government agencies that are
more concerned with crime control or
efficiency than they are with human
betterment. Thus, as with criminological
activities generally, humanistic criminology
is likely to find its home in the college and
university, primarily in academic schools,
departments, or programs of criminology,
criminal justice, or some euphemism for
"police science." Such schools have
blossomed in the past decade throughout the
system of higher education in America and are
found in academic settings throughout the
world. Although varying greatly in emphasis
and curriculum, a separate and distant
discipline made up of "criminologists"
appears to have taken root.
But what is the program pursued by this
discipline? Based on an informal, nonrandom
(i.e., unscientific) sampling of graduate and
undergraduate catalogues and course
descriptions, departments of criminal justice
or criminology tend to be oriented to one or
both of two basic pursuits -- criminaljustice research or management. Although it
is well known that college catalogue
descriptions of courses and course offerings
have little to do with reality and that it is
impossible to discern what is actually taught
in a course from its course descriptions, it
appears clear that graduate schools
particularly (but some undergraduate
departments also) are heavily oriented to
producing criminal justice "scientists" who
are well trained in research methods and
statistics (particularly involving the
acquisition of computer skills). Although
the members of these departments are
undoubtedly concerned with producing scholars
modeled after the social and behavioral
sciences, the skills and knowledge students
in these departments receive is well suited
to employment opportunities in
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criminal-justice agencies of various kinds.
Purposively or not, such departments are
producing criminal-justice management
experts, persons who can organize,
administer, and interpret data banks,
generate evaluation reports, establish and
implement certification standards, or act in
an advisory capacity to higher-level
administrators (see Quinney, 1980: 13-15).
Many of these departments also appear to
be oriented to offering a diverse number of
courses best described as courses in
"Handcuffing 101" that are geared either to
training persons to work in the
criminal-justice field, often at lower-level
starting positions, or to gain promotion
credits for those already employed in it.
Students taking such courses (except for
those who desire "gut course" credits or are
enrolled because they are "interestedn)
normally are looking for the training and
credentials they need to become police
officers, probation or parole officers,
criminal attorneys, or other kinds of
crime-control experts. Although by taking
such courses as "The Police and the
Community," "The Juvenile Justice System,"
and "Parole Procedures," criminal-justice
majors may in fact wind up being better
criminal-justice workers, the intellectual
sophistication and liberalization they
experience by undertaking a liberal arts
degree may well have a greater humanizing
effect than any of the criminology/criminal
justice courses they may encounter. The
point to note is that little by way of
humanism is apparently contained in
criminology-department curricula. Instead,
the emphasis is on training experts in the
business of crime control, a purpose that
would find little significance in a
humanistic discipline. Indeed, as Young
(1984: 12) suggests:
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Rather than seeking to
motivate, train and place students
in the criminal justice system,
criminology should critically
analyze the systems of social
control in ... society. It should
distance itself from any given
system of law, of corrections, of
political philosophy or of economic
endeavor.
En short, the first step in achieving a truly
iumanistic criminology is for criminologists
:o get out of the crime-control business and
Lnto the business of human understanding.
But concretely what would a humanistic
lepartment of criminology look like? What
,inds of courses could be offered and what
:inds of subject matter could be emphasized
)r included? The following represents a bare
ninimum.
For one, a humanistic department of
:riminology would give as much attention to
>hilosophy and ethics as it does to
itatistics, research methods, and computer
?rograming. Such offerings could not only be
Lncluded in the list of electives, but could)e required subjects for graduation. They
:ould include but not be limited to subjects
3uch as the philosophy of punishment; the
?hilosophical, ethical, and moral issues
regarding law and social justice; and the
ethics of justice and law enforcement
(involving, for example, the ethicality as
3pposed to the simple expedience or necessity
)f plea negotiation). From the perspective
)f humanism, lectures and seminars on a topic
such as rehabilitation would include more
than discussion of "how to do it.", "does it
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work?", "how cost-effective is it?", and the
like. They could also, or instead, focus on
such matters as "should it be done?", "is it
legitimate or moral?" and "what forms of
rehabilitative activity are ethical or
unethical, regardless of their
effectiveness?". These topics may of course
be addressed in contemporary courses, but I
doubt whether they form the core or central
theme of many.
Most schools of criminology pay special
attention to teaching (at least at a
rudimentary level) criminal law and
procedure. Such topics would also receive
extensive attention in a humanistic
criminology. But, rather than simply
discussing the "technocratics" (e.g., mens
tea) of law, attention could focus on the
social, economic, and political forces that
shape criminal law and its administration, as
well as the consequences which emanate from
its existence. Insofar as crime is a legal
construct made possible and justified by
criminal law, an understanding of the nature
and implications of law is as crucial to
criminological education as is a knowledge of
the law itself (e.g., Chambliss and Seidman,
1982).
Although the study of criminal behavior
(etiology) would probably find less emphasis
in humanistic criminology than it has
traditionally received, to the extent that
such conduct is studied at all, humanistic
criminology could considerably broaden the
scope and purpose of such inquiry. While
conventional (scientific) criminologists have
been fascinated with the criminality of the
under-classes of society and concerned with
finding ways of controlling such conduct, a
humanistic perspective would direct our
attention to upper-world, "political,"
governmental, corporate, and various other
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forms of criminality and could broaden our
purpose beyond simply finding ways to "curb"
it but to understanding the larger social
realm in which such conduct proliferates and
the humanistic implications these forms of
criminality have. Although some rather
significant work has already begun in this
regard (e.g., Geis & Meier, 1977; Clinard &
Yeager, 1980; Turk, 1982) in a humanistic
criminology much more extensive inquiry would
be found.
Conventional course offerings in the
administration of justice tend to lean toward
a "how to do it" variety with little emphasis
on the social and other implications
administering justice entails. In addition
to addressing these implications (in a
philosophy of justice course perhaps) in a
department of humanistic criminology other
kinds of "how to do it" courses could also be
offered. Such courses could address the task
of revolutionary change, how to achieve
social liberation, and the analysis of
political power and government. "How to'
courses in the administration of justice,
regardless of how well intended (i.e., its
fair dispensation) they may be, ultimately
serve to perpetuate the status wLjq. They do
so because they give credence to and promote
administrative efficiency on the part of the
political structures that rest on the pillars
of law and which, by their very nature,
underpin existing relationships. Invariably
these relationships advantage some people or
groups over others. Therefore, to the extent
that humanistic criminology is dedicated to
social change, betterment, and justice "how
to" courses in social change are basic to the
education of humanistic criminologists. If
criminology is to be a science at all (which
does not preclude it being humanistic at the
same time) it must be a "political" science
as well as a science of politics and
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government.
CONCLUSION
In answer to the question: "Is
humanistic criminology possible?" we can
offer but one response: "Of course it isl"
But accomplishing it would require change on
the part of the discipline. This would
undoubtedly be extremely difficult, and
criminologists who benefit from their roles
as servants of the political state would
surely resist changes that threaten their
enterprise. But I do not think these
obstacles are impossible to overcome.
The necessary changes would not only be
in the form of curriculum changes, or
modifications in research topics, strategies,
theory, and orientation. Tg wo uld h&
fundnalchang isn 9p.1=. Criminology
would no longer be simply a science of
people, but a discipline resource for
people. Criminology would no longer be an
enterprise in the service of governments, but
a field devoted to the study and critique of
government. Criminology would no longer
devote its investigations to the benefit of
elites, but a means for a radical appraisal
of elitism. Criminology would no longer rest
its subject matter on the foundations of
criminal law, but would be devoted to the
analyses of law and legal oppression. By so
doing criminology would cease to be merely
another social science, another academic
discipline, another cog in the machinery of
modern bureaucracies and governments. Rather
criminology would become a humanistic
enterprise, an instrument for human
betterment, freedom, and fulfillment.
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